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This chapter takes as it starting point a debate within art critical and historical circles of 
perhaps surprising longevity. Over the past five years the debate has continued concerning the 
phenomenon of “Relational Aesthetics” or “Relational Art”. The term “Relational Aesthetics” 
was one of the terms coined by the curator Nicholas Bourriard as a way of conceptualising 
various art practices emergent in the later ‘90s and continuing to the present day which have 
as their ‘raison d’etre’ some form of social interaction or participation.1 As Bourriard has it: 
“an art that takes as its theoretical horizon the sphere of human interactions and its social 
context, rather than the assertion of an autonomous and private symbolic space”.2 
 
That said examples of “Relation Aesthetics” in Bourriard’s canon, vary considerably from the 
more abstracted work of Liam Gillick to the more ‘sociable’ work of Rirkrit Tiravanija.   
 
In terms of Relational Aesthetics the latter artist has become emblematic of the concept of 
‘relational art’ and the ‘ethico-political’ position its aesthetic subtends, as argued by 
Bourriaud. The Thai artist Rirkrit Tiravanija is perhaps best known for his Untitled (Still) 
1992 at 303 Gallery New York. For this ‘work’ Tiravanija moved everything in the ‘back 
rooms’ of the gallery, the office and storeroom etc into the main exhibition space, where the 
gallery director thus had to work ‘in public’, turned the storeroom into an open kitchen for 
visitors and in the gallery cooked curries for visitors, the left-overs of which further informed 
the ‘ex-verted’ exhibit space when the artist was not there. Similarly for a later work, Untitled 
(Tomorrow is Another Day) 1996 he installed a wooden reconstruction of his own apartment 
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and opened it for use by visitors, inviting them to ‘live’, i.e. cook and eat, wash, sleep and 
generally lounge in the living room.  
 
He has more recently also extended his aspirations to encompass “The Land” as a ‘massive-
scale artist-run space’ designed as a collective for ‘social engagement’ in rural Thailand.  
 
This chapter critically explores the phenomenon of ‘relational aesthetics’ in relation to three 
themes; the extent to which we might consider social relations as underpinned by an 
understating of antagonism and difference, as opposed to an assumption of ‘conviviality’ and 
assimilated collective identity; the extent to which we might more strongly (than Bourriard) 
read relational aesthetics in terms of  resistance to art’s commodification within capitalist 
social and economic relations; or different again from either of these, if there is an approach 
to relational aesthetics, understood through  Derrida’s ‘ethical demand’,  which opens up an 
ethico-political dimension which may be obscured by the two former approaches.  For this 
latter, amongst other references, I make use of Derrida’s conversation piece entitled “Eating 
Well” 3and I am making a ‘play upon’ this as it relates to the subject of Tiravanija’s work.  
 
Such work we may understand as problematising certain notions of ‘exchange’ between 
persons and social relations as infiltrated through and through by capitalist exchange 
relations, epitomised by the commodification of art through the gallery ‘system’ by both 
‘literally ‘exposing’ the gallery system and the artist as purveyor of commodity and offering 
an alternative as the ‘gift’ without return.  
 
A more resistant version of this challenge however may be found in the work of Thomas 
Hirschhorn who is not a major feature of “Relational Aesthetics”. Where we might say 
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Tiravanija wants to deconstruct the autonomous, bureaucratised and commodified space of 
the gallery (and the autonomous figure of the artist, as further exemplified by his ‘private 
living space’) from within, Hirschhorn takes art out into ‘illegitimate’ spaces and places and 
‘trashes’ its ‘legitimate’ materials and forms of display in order to disturb the normal 
inscription of difference between ‘ privileged art public’ and the economically deprived 
groups who inhabit the locations of his works and by dint of that make the works their own.  
 
Bataille Monument 2002, in Documenta 11, was  a ‘make shift’ set of shacks, providing 
opportunities through books in a library, television and video installations and other visual 
ephemera to find out about and pay tribute to the life and work of the philosopher George 
Bataille. This was situated in the middle of a working class, predominantly minority ethnic, 
Turkish, housing project in a suburb of Kassel, Germany (the venue for the Documenta)  and 
as part of  the ‘work’ could only to be reached by the visitors by way of trips by a Turkish cab 
company. The effect of this work, as the art critic Claire Bishop suggests, was to 
 
“…contrive a curious rapprochement between the influx of art tourists and the area’s 
residents. Rather than the local populace becoming subject to what he calls the ‘zoo effect’, 
Hirschhorn’s project made the art public feel like hapless intruders. Even more disruptively, 
in the light of the international art world’s intellectual pretensions, Monument took the local 
inhabitants seriously as potential Bataille readers…The complicated play of identificatory and 
dis-identificatory mechanisms at work…were radically and disruptively thought-
provoking…the Bataille Monument served to destabilise (but also to potentially liberate) any 
sense of what community identity might be, or of what it means to be a ‘fan’ of art and 
philosophy.” 4 
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More trenchantly and controversially perhaps, the exploitation inscribed in capitalist social 
relations is both repeated and critiqued in the work of Santiago Sierra who again does not 
feature in “Relational Aesthetics” but forms part of the critical literature responding to it.  An 
array of his works: 250 cm Line Tattooed on Six Paid People 1999; Workers Who Cannot be 
Paid, Remunerated to Remain Inside Cardboard Boxes 2000; The Wall of a Gallery Pulled 
Out, Inclined Sixty Degrees from the Ground and Sustained by Five People 2000; Persons 
Paid to Have their Hair Dyed Blond 2001;Wall Enclosing a Space, 2003,  both foreground 
the exploitative nature of labour and the reduction of social relations to a relationship between 
things, as well as folding the artist into this ‘critical’ situation as an exploiter himself.  
 
Such works could be seen as dystopian nihilistic renderings of both ‘life as it lived’ for many 
people not often acknowledged in the ‘art world’ and of the exploitative relation that very 
lack of acknowledgement has inscribed within it. Arguably they are more than this to the 
extent that his work does indeed spill out into and across the ‘unmentionables’ of 
immigration, contemporary ‘enslavement’ to ‘slave-wage’ labour and precarious means of 
making one’s living. Bishop suggests, “The work does not offer an experience of human 
empathy… but a pointed racial/economic non identification, ‘this is not me’”.5 
 
One could broadly say that all these works share a desire to both newly ‘work’ a notion of 
art’s autonomy and resistance to commodification in the very heteronomy of these ‘relational 
practices’ as ‘echoes’ of everyday life which yet ‘re-mark’ and bring the inequities and 
commodified reaches of everyday life to the fore.  But I’ll say more about the notion of 
autonomy versus heteronomy later. 
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The criticisms levelled against Bourriard’s concept of relational aesthetics have revolved 
around a re-visiting of various inflections of Marxist and Post-Marxist arguments in respect to 
art. As I have previously outlined, I want to consider these but will ultimately move to an 
argument coming from a slightly different place, more closely aligned to how I see Derrida’s 
views of art and politics and how we might view art and how we might view politics today in 
ways which may be deemed more aligned to an art of the political than a science of it.  
 
One of the well referenced arguments from Claire Bishop in connection with Relational 
Aesthetics stems from an article written in the influential journal October in 2002, soon after 
the English translation of Bourriard’s work.6 Claire Bishop’s view of the theory of Relational 
Aesthetics and some of the practices identified as exemplifying this phenomenon is that the 
model of social relation invoked by Bourriard lacks ‘resistance’ and the ‘antagonism’ that is 
constitutive of relation, as Bishop reads it via the political theorists, Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe.7   
 
To summarise, Laclau and Mouffe build a notion of political relationships and the social 
sphere or ‘community’ on two principles, one a radicalisation of the idea of hegemony (the 
means by which the view of a particular group becomes ‘universalised’ as the ‘dominant 
view) and the notion of the split or incomplete subject which derives from Lacan.  Laclau and 
Mouffe recognise the logic of capital as a logic of dislocation and dispersal which does not 
produce the formed political subject of the ‘proletariat’ which will stand up against capitalist 
relations but instead various subject groupings or groups whose interests relate through a 
model of ‘antagonism’ such that at any one time one particular interest group may attain 
partial ‘universalism’ and thus partial and momentary hegemony over others. Hegemony and 
the democratic consensus are thus never fully complete and always open to further 
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contestation and antagonisms. Democracy is the continual drawing up of these antagonisms 
and partial subjectivities and subject identifications. Underpinning this model is the notion of 
the ‘failed’ subject from Lacan. The ‘subject’ is always held incomplete by the ‘other’ 
inscribed within it and unattainable. It is this very incompleteness which drives the subject to 
desire for identification.  
 
It is tempting therefore to ‘read’ the works here cited as in some sense ‘presenting’ along a 
spectrum of incisiveness perhaps from naïve conviviality to resistance to exploitation, the 
fragile articulations of partial identifications through antagonism upon which the ‘social’ 
realm or ‘community’ rests. However, it may be argued, there is a need to read the works 
relation to the political with a far greater appreciation of the complexity arising from art’s 
‘autonomy’ or ‘heteronomy’ with regard to the social and political.  
 
From a Marxist perspective what is at stake is less the question of politics and art in 
connection with the constitution of subjectivities and the discursivity of social relations, but 
instead the question of politics and of art as a question of the struggle over the commodity. As 
Stewart Martin suggests, “Whatever the marginality and precariousness of art’s relations to 
received ideas about politics, it is in many ways fundamentally constituted in the struggle 
over its subjection to commodification. So, if we think of the political in terms of this 
struggle, we can see art as politically formed to its innermost core. In a certain sense we can 
see art as a primal scene of politics in capitalist culture.”8 
 
The debate over the commodification of art (and hence its affirmative character in supporting 
capitalist social relations) or its intrinsic resistance to commodification is well known. What 
has become clear is that there is no simple ‘pure art’ or ‘anti-art’ position to be had.  
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“…On the one hand, the anti-art position has had to confront the extent to which the 
dissolution of art into life is not simply emancipatory but dissolution of art into capitalist life. 
It has also had to confront the extent to which capitalist culture has itself taken on this anti-art 
function to this end. This reveals a critical dimension to pure art, which the anti-art position 
must recognise if its critique of art is to function as a critique of commodification. On the 
other hand, the pure art position has had to confront the extent to which art’s purity is a form 
of reification deeply entwined within art’s commodification, indebted to capitalist culture. 
This requires that the defence of art against commodification must incorporate a dimension of 
anti-art if it is to criticise this entwinement. Either way, art’s resistance to commodification is 
obliged to take the form of an immanent critique or self-criticism. This suggests that the self-
critical constitution of modern art is due to its commodity-form.”9 
 
Art’s autonomy is intrinsically tied to its heteronymous determination by the social. Stewart 
Martin suggests that Bourriard’s concept of relational aesthetics and its theoretical elaboration 
presents the extreme counter  and in that sense the flip-side to Theodor Adorno’s concept of 
art’s ‘anti-social’ character. “Whereas Adorno seeks the critical force of art through the 
radicalisation of its fetishism against exchange, Bourriard seeks it through the radicalisation 
of its social exchange against fetishism.”10 
 
Between these positions we see the re-enactment of the two sides of the same coin; a dialectic 
of autonomy and heteronomy.  Thus for Martin, Bourriard’s investment in the capacity for 
relational art to eschew ‘the object’ and produce social exchange which ‘escapes’ the 
commodification of capital is found wanting.  We might say that Santiago Sierra’s works 
brings this weakness to the fore.  
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“…In these works the re-direction of our attention from objects to subject does not produce a 
space of inter-subjective conviviality, but the instrumental commodification of labour that 
social exchange can be reduced to in capitalist societies. Art is stripped of its aura of free 
association and acts out a tragedy: the utopian conception of art, that we should relate to it as 
if it were another person is realised in dystopian form, sweating in a cardboard box on a 
minimum wage.” 11 
 
 
I have sympathy with these readings but I want to provide another reading where the 
relationship between the political and the ethical may be further dwelt upon.  
 
However I do not mean an ethics of the present so much as the infinitely demanding and 
impossible ethics that Derrida’s thinking calls forth and to which I suggest art can ally.  
 
In Specters of Marx and other writings in which Derrida considers the political and 
‘democracy’, as democracy-to-come, the political is ethical through and through in a way 
which binds us to the other as an unnameable and inassimilable ‘other to come’ for which we 
have responsibility.12 This is very different from an ethics based upon the ultimately 
‘autonomous’ subject with a conscience towards others, suggested say by the ‘love thy 
neighbour as thyself’ dictum.  
 
The exorbitant ethical demand in Derrida’s work,  inscribed into the political, renders the time 
of the political a ‘time out of joint’, crossed by the impossibilities of redemption of the past or 
calculation of the future, if it is to be a ‘true’ politics unmarred by its violence towards the 
ethical. 
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For Derrida, the political is the tracing of this gap between representation and the 
groundlessness it seeks to obscure, and this is worked through in relation to the various 
encounters with the representations that he writes and talks about. Our responsibility is 
towards the intimation of this differance and limit. It is a responsibility because, within this 
gap, the exclusionary nature of our representations are opened to the other and the ‘time of the 
other’, as captured in Derrida’s important figure of the spectral and his resistance to ontology 
and, to an extent, materiality. Art is political in the sense that it is [not] representation but is 
capable of exceeding representation by‘re-marking’ the intimation of the relation between 
representation and its inassimilable ‘other’. 
 
Art is an encounter with the infinitely demanding and impossible to contain ‘other’, the 
‘immemorial past’ and ‘always to come’ that is our responsibility; ‘that’ which calls for our 
unconditional hospitality and justice. 13 
 
Relational aesthetics may provide us with a means to reflect upon not what art ‘presents’ or 
points to as a utopia of emancipation or its dystopian opposite but as an opening onto to 
responsibility.  
 
This is the distinction Simon Critchley makes between classical anarchism, concerned with 
freedom and struggles for ‘liberation’ and a different anarchism organised around 
responsibility, “an infinite responsibility that arises in relation to a situation of injustice.”14   
 
Critchley is interested in a new found anarchism as an ethical-political phenomenon, 
stemming from Levinas and his critique of the ‘archic’ subject as the sovereign subject. 
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Rather for Levinas the subject is affected by its relation to the other in a way that refuses the 
self-positing sovereign subject; the subject is thus an ‘an-archic’ ethical 
subject…untrammelled by a politics of state sovereignty or substantiated community as the 
‘arche’ principle. 15 
 
I want to draw this together by returning to Tiravanija’s Untitled (Still) talked about most 
often in terms of the ‘gift’ of cooked food and the social exchange of eating together. 
 
In relation to this I want to bring together two statements; 
 
1. “If the relation to the real is the realm of the ethical, and the work of sublimation is the 
realm of the aesthetic, the aesthetic intimates the excess of the ethical over the 
aesthetic”.16 
 
2. “The moral question is thus not, nor has it ever been: should one eat or not eat, eat this 
and not that…but since one must eat in any case and since it is and tastes good to eat, 
and since there is no other definition of the good, how for goodness sake should one 
eat well? And what does this imply? What is eating? How is this metonymy of 
introjection to be regulated? ... “One must eat well” does not mean above all taking in 
and grasping in itself but learning and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat. 
One never eats entirely on one’s own: this constitutes the rule underlying that 
statement, “One must eat well.” It is a rule offering infinite hospitality.”17  
 
I take each of these in turn. Insofar as the aesthetic “allows” us to encounter the infinite and 
exorbitant demand of the ‘other’ in a mode of sublimation, which “takes the human being to 
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the limit of a desire which cannot be fully represented” and ‘we’ are “allowed a relation to 
(what Lacan calls) the Thing that does not crush or destroy us”, we ‘experience’ this ethical 
dimension.  However, understood this way it has the structure of tragedy about it and indeed 
of heroic sacrifice. Antigone is the paradigm of the ethical sublimated through the aesthetic in 
Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis, for example.18 But the tragic replays the ‘arch’ of the 
ultimately self-possessing and ‘authentic’ subject. The tragic subject is he or she who 
struggles in the pitting of desire against necessity in order to achieve “authenticity”, even as 
this may be on behalf of the ‘other’. 19 
 
Derrida traces this paradigm of the authentic subject through the structure of sacrifice in 
relation to his meditation on eating well.  Insofar as the ethical subject is drawn from an 
essential ‘human’-ism, this subject  bears the trace of a structure of sacrifice, whereby the 
animal is understood to be sacrificed for the ‘good’ of the community and the animal is also 
an ‘introjected’ substance of food in many cultures. The ‘other’ is interiorised and assimilated 
into the ‘self-same’. Derrida refers to other modes of introjection through the mouth, 
symbolically, such as the bread and wine of Christ’s body and blood in the terms of this 
sacrificial structure through which “we” become-subject through processes of “idealizing 
interiorisation”. 20To bring it back to politics this is Hegel’s ultimately underlying structure 
for the community and the state. 21 
 
Derrida’s huge question is, how do we remain open to the other, responding and responsible 
to the ethical demand in a situation of injustice and offer unconditional hospitality and “eat 
well”? This takes the question of ‘eating well’ and what it is to live well as an ethical being, 
which indeed is increasingly a subject of science and politics, even bio-politics, into a 
different dimension of responsibility. 22 It is this ‘an-archic’, non-idealising; infinitely 
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demanding but non-tragic or ‘sacrificial’ structure of responsibility that gives us much more 
to think than we might have first thought  about Tiravanija’s own project of  ‘Eating Well’.  
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